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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, academic freedom is generally understood to
be the idea that “[t]eachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in
discussing their subject.”1 In particular, professional academic freedom
for university faculty involves: (1) freedom in research and publication,
(2) freedom in classroom discussion concerning the curriculum, and (3)
freedom to speak or write as citizens.2 In the United States, academic
freedom3 is seen as a key component to a normal, functioning public
university4 environment.5 As such, it would seem natural for academic

1. The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (“1940 Statement”)
defined “academic freedom.” The American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”) and
the Association of American Colleges (“AAC”) jointly authored the 1940 Statement after a series of
joint conferences on the subject of academic freedom and tenure. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV.
PROFESSORS & ASS’N OF AM. COLLS., 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND TENURE 3 (1940) [hereinafter 1940 STATEMENT], available at http://www.aaup.org/NR/
rdonlyres/EBB1B330-33D3-4A51-B534-CEE0C7A90DAB/0/1940StatementofPrincipleson
AcademicFreedomandTenure.pdf.
2. The 1940 Statement is a restatement of principles. Thus, it serves as a guideline, and not
binding law. But, the AAUP does “enforce” the Statement in a way by listing colleges and
universities that it finds to be in violation of the 1940 Statement. See generally Am. Ass’n of Univ.
Professors, Censure List, AAUP, available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/about/censuredadmins/
(last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
3. See generally Philip G. Altbach, Academic freedom: International realities and
challenges, 41 HIGHER EDUC. 205 (2001). Academic freedom is generally strong in major
industrialized countries such as the United States, Japan, and Germany. Id. at 215. But, academic
freedom has come under attack in many parts of the world, especially in less industrialized areas
where dictatorial forms of government are prevalent. Id. at 207. For example, professors may be
prosecuted and imprisoned for activities viewed to be anti-regime in China, Vietnam, and Cuba. Id.
at 211. In addition, Singapore and Malaysia have long had informal bans on certain research topics
such as ethnic conflict, religion, and local corruption, because the topics might raise questions and
doubt about government policies. Id. at 213. And in countries with limits on academic freedom,
academic faculty must act and express themselves in a particular way in order to ensure budgetary
allocations and research funds from the government. Id.
But academic freedom restriction is not just a problem in non-industrialized countries.
Even in places such as the United States, academic freedom is restricted in subtle ways. For
example, the academy restricts itself through efforts to enforce “political correctness”—imposing
academic orthodoxy from a liberal or radical perspective. Id. at 215. Opposing views are not
welcomed. In fact, 34% of academics in the United States feel that there are political and
ideological restrictions on what a scholar may publish. Id. at 216-17.
4. The majority opinion in Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch.
Dist., 624 F.3d 332, 343-44 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted), distinguishes the importance of
academic freedom in an university environment, as opposed to in primary and secondary education:
As a cultural and a legal principle, academic freedom ‘was conceived and implemented
in the university’ out of concern for ‘teachers who are also researchers or scholars-work
not generally expected of elementary and secondary school teachers.’ . . . ‘[U]niversities
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition’ and the constitutional rules
applicable in higher education do not necessarily apply in primary and secondary
schools, where students generally do not choose whether or where they will attend
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personnel to be given extra constitutional protection not afforded to
other public employees under the First Amendment.6 However, the
current constitutional law framework does not adequately reflect this
seemingly intuitive understanding.7
The leading case on the First Amendment and free speech in the
workplace is Garcetti v. Ceballos,8 in which the United States Supreme
Court held that governmental employees who speak out pursuant to job
school.
5. In Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (citations omitted),
Justice Powell explained:
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long
has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student
body. Mr. Justice Frankfurter summarized the ‘four essential freedoms’ that constitute
academic freedom:
‘It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there
prevail ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university—to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.’
Our national commitment to the safeguarding of these freedoms within university
communities was emphasized in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967):
‘Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment . . . . The Nation’s future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection.’
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. However, extra constitutional protection would have to be a
product of constitutional interpretation because the First Amendment does not actually contain any
express recognition of academic freedom. See also David M. Rabban, Functional Analysis of
“Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53-SUM LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 237 (1990) (“Fitting academic freedom within the rubric of the first
amendment is in many respects an extremely difficult challenge. The term ‘academic freedom,’ in
obvious contrast to ‘freedom of the press,’ is nowhere mentioned in the text of the first
amendment.”).
7. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment”, 99
YALE L.J. 251, 252-53 (1989):
The First Amendment protects academic freedom. This simple proposition stands
explicit or implicit in numerous judicial opinions, often proclaimed in fervid rhetoric.
Attempts to understand the scope and foundation of a constitutional guarantee of
academic freedom, however, generally result in paradox or confusion. The cases, shorn
of panegyrics, are inconclusive, the promise of rhetoric reproached by the ambiguous
realities of academic life.
The problems are fundamental: There has been no adequate analysis of what
academic freedom the Constitution protects or of why it protects it. Lacking definition
or guiding principle, the doctrine floats in law, picking up decisions as a hull does
barnacles.
8. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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responsibilities are not protected by the First Amendment from employer
discipline for that speech.9 While the United States Supreme Court has
stated in dicta that an academic freedom exception to this limit may
exist, the Court has not yet provided any guidance for this hypothetical
exception.10 As a result of these uncertain circumstances, few lower
courts have recognized an academic freedom exception to the First
Amendment.11 Of those that have, even fewer have attempted to define
the boundaries for this exception, leading to an inconsistent
interpretation of educators’ constitutional rights.12 This discrepancy
amongst jurisdictions threatens to undermine the First Amendment
freedom of speech by chilling an area of expression (academic) that
depends on the lack of restriction to be of any inherent value; academic
speech is based upon the free, unrestricted exchange of thoughts and
ideas.
In order to uphold the integrity of the First Amendment, it is
essential that the Supreme Court establish a clear academic freedom
exception to First Amendment jurisprudence. This Comment proposes
that an academic freedom exception should exist based upon the history
of academic freedom. The Comment will also discuss the limits and
bounds for such an exception. Part II will begin by looking at the
history of First Amendment law surrounding free speech in the
workplace. Part III will then examine different circuit approaches to the
Garcetti limitation to the First Amendment right to freedom of speech in
the academic context. Part IV will lay out a proposed test and the

9. Id. at 421 (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”).
10. Id. at 425 (“There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for
by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not,
decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving
speech related to scholarship or teaching.”).
11. Kramer v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 715 F. Supp. 2d 335, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
(quoting Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers’ Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30
J.L. & EDUC. 1, 1 (2001)) (“In the absence of any Supreme Court precedent squarely addressing the
scope of public school teachers’ free speech rights in the classroom, lower federal courts and state
courts have been forced to rely on the [inadequate] precedents established in either Pickering v.
Board of Education [, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) ] or Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.”).
12. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided to not
apply the Garcetti academic freedom exception in a case involving a high school teacher who
posted religious material on a bulletin board because “[t]he Court explicitly did not decide whether
this analysis would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to teaching.” Lee
v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 694-95 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007). Instead, the court analyzed the
issue under the old Pickering/Connick test. See id. at 689, 694-95 n.11.
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reasoning behind each element. Finally, the Comment will demonstrate
how this test can serve as a guiding point for future free speech cases in
the academic workplace.
II. BACKGROUND
For most of the 20th century, it was unchallenged that a public
employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of
employment, including those which restricted constitutional rights.13
However, a series of cases during the Cold War led the United States
Supreme Court to revisit this issue.14
During the 1950s-60s, public employees were required to swear
oaths of loyalty to the state and reveal the groups with which they
associated.15 The Court responded by striking down statutes and
regulations that required an employee to deny membership in any
particular party (usually the Communists around that time).16 In the
landmark case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents,17 the Court upheld the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal’s reasoning that the “theory that public
employment . . . may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how
unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.”18 Many statutes and actions
seeking to suppress the rights of public employees were invalidated.19

13. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1983) (citations omitted):
The classic formulation of this position was Justice Holmes’, who, when sitting on the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, observed: ‘A policeman may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.’
For many years, Holmes' epigram expressed this Court’s law.
14. Id. at 144.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
18. Connick, 461 U.S. at 144.
19. Id. (citations omitted):
In Wieman v. Updegraff, the Court held that a State could not require its employees
to establish their loyalty by extracting an oath denying past affiliation with Communists.
In Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, the Court recognized that the government could not
deny employment because of previous membership in a particular party. By the time
Sherbert v. Verner was decided, it was already ‘too late in the day to doubt that the
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of
conditions upon a benefit or privilege.’
It was therefore no surprise when in Keyishian v. Board of Regents the Court
invalidated New York statutes barring employment on the basis of membership in
‘subversive’ organizations, observing that the theory that public employment which may
be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how
unreasonable, had been uniformly rejected.
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However, Keyishian did not stand for the ruling that no conditions
could be placed on public employees.20 In fact, the government has
greater power to regulate the speech of its employees than its citizens21
because the government has a legitimate reason to be concerned about
operational efficiency and effectiveness in performing its tasks.22 The
right to speak out in the workplace is qualified because certain speech
can impair the effective functioning of the unit; dissension can distract
and impede policy.23 For example, “in the context of a harmonious
working and learning environment,” academic personnel do not “enjoy
an unqualified First Amendment right to engage in offensive speech that
would compromise relationships with colleagues or students,”
“undermine administrative direction,” or “advocate for a particular
candidate.”24 At the same time, however, public employers cannot use
20. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-06 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d
Cir. 1965)).
21. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (citations omitted) (“When a citizen enters
government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.
Government employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their
employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of
public services.”).
22. Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom and the
Application of Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 147
(2009) (“The government is rightly concerned with operational efficiency and effectiveness in
performing its tasks.”).
23. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1987):
But in weighing the State’s interest in discharging an employee based on any claim that
the content of a statement made by the employee somehow undermines the mission of
the public employer, some attention must be paid to the responsibilities of the employee
within the agency. The burden of caution employees bear with respect to the words they
speak will vary with the extent of authority and public accountability the employee’s role
entails. Where, as here, an employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public
contact role, the danger to the agency’s successful functioning from that employee’s
private speech is minimal.
24. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672-74 (1994):
[W]e have never expressed doubt that a government employer may bar its
employees from using Mr. Cohen’s offensive utterance to members of the public or to
the people with whom they work. . . [W]hen an employee counsels her co-workers to do
their job in a way with which the public employer disagrees, her managers may tell her
to stop, rather than relying on counterspeech. . . [T]hough a private person is perfectly
free to uninhibitedly and robustly criticize a state governor’s legislative program, we
have never suggested that the Constitution bars the governor from firing a high-ranking
deputy for doing the same thing. Even something as close to the core of the First
Amendment as participation in political campaigns may be prohibited to government
employees.
[W]e have given substantial weight to government employers’ reasonable
predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved is on a matter of public
concern, and even though when the government is acting as sovereign our review of
legislative predictions of harm is considerably less deferential.
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authority over their employees to silence discourse simply because they
disagree with the content of employees’ speech.25
Traditionally, however, public employees have a right to speak out
on matters of public concern.26 To determine whether an employee
should prevail in a First Amendment claim, pre-Garcetti courts relied on
the Pickering/Connick test, which requires an employee to prove that the
speech involved a matter of public concern and that the speech was a
motivating factor in the adverse employment decision.27 On the other

….
[T]he above examples do show that constitutional review of government
employment decisions must rest on different principles than review of speech restraints
imposed by the government as sovereign. The restrictions discussed above are allowed
not just because the speech interferes with the government’s operation. Speech by
private people can do the same, but this does not allow the government to suppress it.
Rather, the extra power the government has in this area comes from the nature of the government’s
mission as employer.
See also Tepper & White, supra note 22, at 149-50. There are other limits on academic
personnel’s constitutional rights as a result of the public employment context. Id. For example,
citizens enjoy a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, which
normally includes a requirement that the search be founded upon probable cause and a court-issued
warrant. Id. However, neither is required when an academic employer performs a noninvestigatory search of an employee’s office or investigates work-related misconduct. Id. While
academic personnel may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in certain areas of the workplace,
the reasonableness of a search is influenced by the needs of the employer to maintain an effective
workplace. Id.
Regarding due process, at-will academic personnel do not possess a liberty interest
providing protection from discharge based upon an employer’s mistaken reasons, when the reasons
are not made public. Id. As a result, an at-will academic employee can be discharged for
inadequate or even false reasons. Id. The United States Supreme Court recently held that the
“class-of-one” theory of equal protection (based on irrational treatment of one person rather than
class-based discrimination) is not available in the public employee context. Id. Discretion is
granted to supervisory personnel to make subjective, individualized decisions. Id.
25. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384 (“Vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not
use authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but
simply because superiors disagree with the content of employees’ speech.”).
26. Id. at 383-84.
27. Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1186 (6th Cir. 1995):
The threshold question . . . is whether [the employee’s] speech may be ‘fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.’. . . If the First
Amendment violation was a substantial or motivating factor in the termination, the
employer may present evidence the employee would have been terminated in the
absence of protected conduct. . . The Connick court noted, however, ‘if [the speech]
cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is
unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reason for [the] discharge.’ Thus, if Dambrot’s
speech is not a matter of public concern, the court’s inquiry ends.’
Schrier v. Univ. of Colorado, 427 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 2005):
First, we must determine whether the employee’s speech involves a matter of public
concern. If so, we then balance the employee’s interest in commenting upon matters of
public concern against the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
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hand, regardless of whether the employee has carried his or her burden,
an employer prevails if it proves that its interest in an effective
workforce outweighs the employee’s free speech interest, or that the
adverse employment action would have been the same regardless of the
protected speech.28 Garcetti added an extra element to this balancing
test by asking whether the speech was made pursuant to the employee’s
job responsibilities or involved the employee speaking out as a citizen.29
In the former instance, an affirmative answer would weigh in the
employer’s favor.30 In the latter instance, an affirmative answer would
weigh in the employee’s favor.31
A.

Pickering v. Board of Education Of Township High School
District: The Balancing Test

One of the seminal cases on the issue of free speech in the
workplace is Pickering v. Board of Education Township High School
District.32 In this 1968 case, the plaintiff was a high school teacher.33 In
a reaction to a recently proposed tax increase, the teacher sent a letter to
a local newspaper, criticizing the School Board and district
superintendent’s handling of past proposals to raise new revenue for the
school.34 Specifically, the teacher criticized the allocation of financial
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Third, if the balance
tips in favor of the employee, the employee then must show that the speech was a
substantial factor or a motivating factor in the detrimental employment decision. Fourth,
if the plaintiff establishes that speech was such a factor, the employer may demonstrate
that it would have taken the same action against the employee even in the absence of the
protected speech.
28. Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1186; Schrier, 427 F.3d at 1262. The U.S. Supreme Court has also
noted that there may be some positions in public employment where the need for confidentiality is
so great that even completely correct public statements may furnish a permissible ground for
dismissal. Also, there may be instances in public employment where the relationship between a
superior and inferior is so intimate that public criticism of the superior by the subordinate could
seriously undermine the effectiveness of the working relationship. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563, 570 n.3
(1968).
29. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“We hold that when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.”).
30. Id. at 421.
31. Id. at 422.
32. Pickering, 391 U.S. 563.
33. Id. at 564. As of 1961, Plaintiff Marvin L. Pickering was a teacher in the Township High
School District 205, Will County, Illinois. Id.
34. Id. (“[Plaintiff sent] a letter to a local newspaper in connection with a recently proposed
tax increase that was critical of the way in which the Board and the district superintendent of
schools had handled past proposals to raise new revenue for the schools.”).
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resources between the school’s education and athletic programs, and
charged the superintendent with attempting to prevent teachers in the
district from opposing or criticizing the recent proposal.35 The letter was
published in the newspaper.36 Subsequently, the Board held a hearing
during which it determined that the letter contained many false
statements and was ultimately “detrimental to the efficient operation and
administration of the schools of the district.”37 As a result, the teacher
was dismissed.38
The plaintiff sought review of the Board’s dismissal on First and
Fourteenth Amendment grounds.39 However, his dismissal was affirmed
all the way up through the Supreme Court of Illinois.40 Then, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case.41

35. Id. at 566 (“The letter constituted, basically, an attack on the School Board’s handling of
the 1961 bond issue proposals and its subsequent allocation of financial resources between the
schools’ educational and athletic programs. It also charged the superintendent of schools with
attempting to prevent teachers in the district from opposing or criticizing the proposed bond
issue.”).
36. Id. at 565-66. These circumstances lead to Plaintiff’s issue and letter:
In February of 1961 the appellee Board of Education asked the voters of the school
district to approve a bond issue to raise $4,875,000 to erect two new schools. The
proposal was defeated. Then, in December of 1961, the Board submitted another bond
proposal to the voters which called for the raising of $5,500,000 to build two new
schools. This second proposal passed and the schools were built with the money raised
by the bond sales. In May of 1964 a proposed increase in the tax rate to be used for
educational purposes was submitted to the voters by the Board and was defeated.
Finally, on September 19, 1964, a second proposal to increase the tax rate was submitted
by the Board and was likewise defeated. It was in connection with this last proposal of
the School Board that appellant wrote the letter to the editor (which we reproduce in an
Appendix to this opinion) that resulted in his dismissal.
Prior to the vote on the second tax increase proposal a variety of articles attributed to
the District 205 Teachers’ Organization appeared in the local paper. These articles urged
passage of the tax increase and stated that failure to pass the increase would result in a
decline in the quality of education afforded children in the district’s schools. A letter
from the superintendent of schools making the same point was published in the paper
two days before the election and submitted to the voters in mimeographed form the
following day. It was in response to the foregoing material, together with the failure of
the tax increase to pass, that appellant submitted the letter in question to the editor of the
local paper.
37. Id. at 564.
38. Id. at 564-65 (“Appellant’s dismissal resulted from a determination by the Board, after a
full hearing, that the publication of the letter was ‘detrimental to the efficient operation and
administration of the schools of the district’ and hence, under the relevant Illinois statute,
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 122, s 10-22.4(1963), that ‘interests of the schools require(d) (his dismissal).’”).
39. Id. at 565.
40. Id. (“Appellant then sought review of the Board’s action in the Circuit Court of Will
County, which affirmed his dismissal on the ground that the determination that appellant’s letter
was detrimental to the interests of the school system was supported by substantial evidence and that
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The United States Supreme Court recognized that public employees
do not entirely forego their First Amendment right to comment as
citizens on matters of public interest.42 On the other hand, the State has
an interest as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differs significantly from those of the general citizenry.43 The Court
posited a fact-intensive test that would “balance between the interests of
the teacher as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern,
and the interest of the State as an employer in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees.44
Applying its newly-created balancing test to the facts, the United
State Supreme Court reversed the judgment below,45 holding that the
plaintiff-teacher had a right to speak on issues of public importance
(whether a school system requires additional funds was a matter of
legitimate public concern), which may not furnish the basis for his
dismissal from public employment.46
B.

Connick v. Myers: The Rationale Behind the Pickering Decision

The second case to weigh in on the issue of free speech in the
workplace was Connick v. Myers47 in 1982. In this case, Sheila Myers
was an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans for five and a half
years.48 Then in early 1980, Myers was unwillingly transferred to
prosecute cases in a different section of the criminal court.49 Her
protests to her supervisors were unsuccessful and her concerns about
various office matters were ignored.50 On October 7, 1980, Myers
distributed a questionnaire to her fellow district attorneys, polling their
the interests of the schools overruled appellant’s First Amendment rights. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Illinois, two Justices dissenting, affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.”).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 568 (citations omitted):
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion may be read to suggest that
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights
they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in
connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work, it proceeds on a
premise that has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court.
‘(T)he theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected
to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.’
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 575.
46. Id. at 574.
47. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
48. Id. at 140.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 140-41.
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satisfaction level with the management.51 Consequently, her distribution
of the questionnaire was considered an act of insubordination and Myers
was immediately terminated for her refusal to accept the transfer.52
Myers brought a civil rights action, alleging that she had been
wrongfully terminated for exercising her constitutionally guaranteed
right of free speech.53 But in applying the Pickering balancing test, the
United States Supreme Court held that the discharge did not violate
Myer’s First Amendment right of free speech.54

51. Myers distributed the following questionnaire:
Please take the few minutes it will require to fill this out. You can freely express your
opinion WITH ANONYMITY GUARANTEED.
***
1. How long have you been in the Office?
2. Were you moved as a result of the recent transfers?
3. Were the transfers as they effected [sic] you discussed with you by any superior prior
to the notice of them being posted?
4. Do you think as a matter of policy, they should have been?
5. From your experience, do you feel office procedure regarding transfers has been fair?
6. Do you believe there is a rumor mill active in the office?
7. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] overall working performance of A.D.A.
personnel?
8. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] office morale?
9. Do you generally first learn of office changes and developments through rumor?
10. Do you have confidence in and would you rely on the word of:
Bridget Bane
____________________________________________________________________
Fred Harper
____________________________________________________________________
Lindsay Larson
__________________________________________________________________
Joe Meyer
______________________________________________________________________
Dennis Waldron
_________________________________________________________________
11. Do you ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office
supported candidates?
12. Do you feel a grievance committee would be a worthwhile addition to the office
structure?
13. How would you rate office morale?
14. Please feel free to express any comments or feelings you have.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS SURVEY.
Id. at 155-56.
52. Id. at 141.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 154.
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The Connick opinion delved into the Pickering test’s policy and
rationale.55 The Court stated that the “repeated emphasis in Pickering on
the right of a public employee ‘as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern,’ was not accidental.”56 Rather, that language
reflected a “historical evolvement of the rights of public employees and
the common sense realization that government offices could not function
if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.”57
The Connick Court recognized that the Pickering Court formulated
its balancing test with the First Amendment in consideration.58 The First
Amendment is recognized as being “fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.”59 And so “speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment.”60 Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has
frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the “highest
rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is entitled to
special protection.”61
The Connick Court proceeded to flesh out the idea of “public
concern,” noting that cases following the Pickering decision safeguarded
employees who spoke as a citizen on matters of public concern.62 The
55. Id. at 142-54.
56. Id. at 143 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 145.
59. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 284 (1957)).
60. Id. (quoting Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64 (1964)).
61. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
62. See id., which cites and describes several examples:
The controversy in Perry v. Sindermann 408 U.S. 593 (1972), arose from the failure to
rehire a teacher in the state college system who had testified before committees of the
Texas legislature and had become involved in public disagreement over whether the
college should be elevated to four-year status—a change opposed by the Regents. In Mt.
Healthy City Bd of Ed v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), a public school teacher was not
rehired because, allegedly, he had relayed to a radio station the substance of a
memorandum relating to teacher dress and appearance that the school principal had
circulated to various teachers. The memorandum was apparently prompted by the view
of some in the administration that there was a relationship between teacher appearance
and public support for bond issues, and indeed, the radio station promptly announced the
adoption of the dress code as a news item. Most recently, in Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410 (1979), the court held that First Amendment
protection applies when a public employee arranges to communicate privately with his
employer rather than to express his views publicly. Although the subject-matter of Mrs.
Givhan’s statements were not the issue before the Court, it was clear that her statements
concerning the school district’s allegedly racially discriminatory policies involved a
matter of public concern.
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Court recognized that an expression is considered a matter of public
concern if it is related to a matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community.63 But, the speech must transcend personal interest or
opinion in order to be considered a matter of public concern.64 To make
such a determination, the Court must look to “the content, form, and
context of a given statement” as revealed by the entire record.65 Not all
matters that transpire within a government office are of public concern
because that would mean that every remark or criticism directed at a
public official “would plant the seed of a constitutional case.”66 But the
United States Supreme Court has often found teachers’ comments to be
protected in public education settings.67 Some speech, not touching
upon a matter of public concern, may still be within the protection of the
First Amendment; the Court has not completely ruled out speech on
private matters.68
But, in cases where the speech is not of public concern or carries so
little social value, the Court gives government officials “wide latitude in
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in
the name of the First Amendment.”69 In these instances, even mistaken
or unreasonable dismissals are acceptable so long as they do not violate
a fixed tenure or applicable statute or regulation.70 “[W]hen a public
employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the
most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate
forum” to review the agency’s reaction to that behavior.71 The scope of
63. Id. at 146.
64. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 406-07 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
65. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
66. Id. at 149.
67. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-70 (a teacher criticized a school
board’s allocation of funds between athletics and education programs, and the lack of transparency
in seeking additional revenue in a letter to the local newspaper); Perry, 408 U.S. at 595 (a teacher
advocated in favor of the institution’s shift from a 2-yr to a 4-yr academic program); Doyle, 429
U.S. at 282 (a teacher disclosed a school dress code to the media in an effort to garner public
support for a bond issue).
68. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (“We do not suggest, however that Myers’ speech, even if not
touching upon a matter of public concern, is totally beyond the protection of the Amendment. ‘The
First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as
political. ‘Great secular causes, with smaller ones, are guarded.’’”
69. Id. at 146.
70. Id. at 146-47 (“ Perhaps the government employer’s dismissal of the worker may not be
fair, but ordinary dismissals from government service which violate no fixed tenure or applicable
statute or regulation are not subject to judicial review even if the reasons for the dismissal are
alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable.”).
71. Id. at 147. But see id. (citations omitted):
We do not suggest, however, that Myers’ speech, even if not touching upon a matter of
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the court’s responsibility extends to ensuring that citizens are not
deprived of fundamental rights in working for the government.72
The Connick Court recognized that the Pickering balancing test
“requires full consideration of the government’s interest in the effective
and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public.”73 Over a
hundred years ago, the Court noted that the government had a legitimate
purpose in “promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of
official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in the public service.”74
To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide
discretion and control over the management of its personnel and
internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove employees
whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do so with dispatch.
Prolonged retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory
employee can adversely affect discipline and morale in the work place,
foster disharmony, and ultimately impair the efficiency of an office or
agency.75

When close working relationships are required to fulfill public
responsibilities, the courts give a wide degree of deference to the
employer’s judgment.76 In addition, the employer is not required to

public concern, is totally beyond the protection of the First Amendment. ‘The First
Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only to the extent it can be
characterized as political. ‘Great secular causes, with smaller ones, are guarded.’’ We
in no sense suggest that speech on private matters falls into one of the narrow and welldefined classes of expression which carries so little social value, such as obscenity, that
the State can prohibit and punish such expression by all persons in its jurisdiction. For
example, an employee’s false criticism of his employer on grounds not of public concern
may be cause for his discharge but would be entitled to the same protection in a libel
action accorded an identical statement made by a man on the street. We hold only that
when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the
employee’s behavior.
72. Id. at 147. But see id. (“[The Court’s] responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not
deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government; this does not require a
grant of immunity for employee grievances not afforded by the First Amendment to those who do
not work for the state.”).
73. Id. at 150.
74. Id. at 150-51 (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882)).
75. Id. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
76. Id. at 151-52 (“When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public
responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.”).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss4/7

14

Tran: Academic Freedom Exception

13- TRAN_MACRO.DOCM

2012]

10/12/2012 3:04 PM

ACADEMIC FREEDOM EXCEPTION

963

allow events to run their full course and destroy working relationships
before taking action.77
While the employee may successfully prove that his or her speech
was matter of public concern, the Pickering balancing test is only
considered if an employee can satisfy two additional elements: (1) a
public employee must show that the speech was a substantial or
motivating factor in adverse employment action,78 and (2) the
employee’s speech implicated the government’s interest as an
employer.79
C.

Garcetti v. Ceballos: A Modification to the Pickering/Connick
Balancing Test

Currently, the controlling case on the issue of free speech in the
workplace is Garcetti v. Ceballos.80 At the time Garcetti was decided in
2006,81 two inquiries guided the constitutional protections accorded to

77. Id. at 152 (“[W]e do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the
extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest
before taking action.”).
78. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996).
79. Connick, 461 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“When public employees engage in
expression unrelated to their employment while away from the work place, their First Amendment
rights are . . . no different from those of the general public.”).
80. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
81. Id. at 413-17:
The plaintiff was a deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office. In February 2000, he was contacted by a defense attorney about a
pending criminal case. The defense attorney said there were inaccuracies in an affidavit
used to obtain a critical search warrant, and wanted the plaintiff to review the case. The
plaintiff concluded that the affidavit indeed contained serious misrepresentations, and
prepared a disposition memorandum, explaining his concerns and recommending
dismissal of the case. Despite his recommendation, the case proceeded forwards. At
trial the defense called the plaintiff as a witness to testify about his observations
concerning the affidavit. Afterwards, the plaintiff was reassigned to a trial deputy
position, transferred to another courthouse, and denied a promotion. Eventually, the
plaintiff brought suit in state court. However, the District Court granted the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, noting that the memo was written pursuant to the
plaintiff’s employment duties and, thus, the plaintiff was not entitled to First
Amendment protection for the memo’s contents. The decision was reversed on appeal
under the Pickering and Connick weighing test. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s memo recited what he thought to have been
governmental misconduct, which is “inherently a matter of public concern.” Having
determined that the memo satisfied the public-concern requirement, the Court of Appeals
weighed it against his supervisors’ interest in responding to it and the court struck the
balance in the plaintiff’s favor. The court did not consider whether the speech was made
in the plaintiff’s capacity as a citizen. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision.
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public employee speech.82 First, the court had to determine whether the
employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.83 If the
employee was not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern,
the employee had no First Amendment cause of action based on his or
her employer’s reaction to the speech.84 If the employee was speaking
as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the employee would possibly
have a First Amendment claim.85 The court had to additionally ask
whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for
treating the employee differently from any other member of the general
public under the Pickering balancing test.86 The government entity then
had greater discretion in restricting speech that could affect the entity’s
operations.87
This current framework requires a very fact-intensive analysis. But
the Court’s overarching objectives remain the same.88 On one hand, a
citizen must necessarily accept certain limitations on his or her freedom
when he or she enters government service.89 Government employers,
like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their
employees’ words and actions or there would be little chance for the
efficient provision of public services.90 Because of the unique position
that government employees occupy in the public eye and society, they
have a greater potential to contravene governmental policies or impair
the proper performance of governmental functions through their words
and actions.91 Supervisors need to ensure that their employee’s official
communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote
the employer’s mission.92
On the other hand, a citizen who works for the government is still a
citizen and does not “shed all of his or her constitutional rights at the
82. Id. at 418 (“Pickering and the cases decided in its wake identify two inquiries to guide
interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded to public employee speech.”).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. (“Government employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control
over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient
provision of public services.”).
91. Id. at 419 (“Public employees, moreover, often occupy trusted positions in society. When
they speak out, they can express views that contravene governmental policies or impair the proper
performance of governmental functions.”).
92. Id. (“At the same time, the Court has recognized that a citizen who works for the
government is nonetheless a citizen.”).
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workplace door.”93 The First Amendment limits a public employer from
leveraging the employment restriction to restrict the liberties employees
enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.94 So, when an employee is
speaking as a citizen about matters of public concern, he or she is only
restricted to the extent that it is necessary for the employer to operate
efficiently and effectively.95
These First Amendment interests extend beyond the individual
speaker.96 The public also has an “interest in receiving the wellinformed views of government employees engaging in civic
discussion.”97 In all, the Court has tried to promote both the individual
and societal interests served when employees speak as citizens on
matters of public concern and respect the need of government employers
attempting to perform their important public functions.98
The fact that speech is made inside the office, rather than publicly,
and concerns the employee’s employment is not dispositive in the
employee-speech test.99 But, it is dispositive if the expression is made
pursuant to an employee’s duties.100 When public employees make
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.101
“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee
might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of
employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or
created.”102 In this case, that would be speech.103 Garcetti rejected the

93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
95. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 420 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987)).
99. Id. (“That Ceballos expressed his views inside his office, rather than publicly, is not
dispositive. Employees in some cases may receive First Amendment protection for expressions
made at work.”).
100. Id. at 421 (“The controlling factor in Ceballos’ case is that his expressions were made
pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy. . . The significant point is that the memo was written
pursuant to Ceballos’ official duties.”).
101. Id. (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 421-22 (“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a
private citizen.”).
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idea that public employees may also function as citizens even though the
topic pertains to employment responsibilities and most public employees
are not commissioned to carry a specific governmental message.104
The Court was also concerned that imposing a strict balancing test
when an employee is simply performing his or her job duties would
demand permanent judicial intervention into the conduct of
governmental operations, which would be inconsistent with sound
principles of federalism and separation of powers.105 Federal courts
should minimize intrusion into local affairs and should not try to manage
other governmental units.106
This holding is consistent with the potential societal value of
employee speech.107 Refusing First Amendment claims based on
government employees’ work product does not prevent them from
participating in public debate because employees retain the prospect of
constitutional protection for their contributions to the civic discourse.108
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in Garcetti expressed a concern
that the majority opinion imperils “First Amendment protection of
academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers
necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’”109 Justice

104. Id. at 426-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 436-38 (Souter, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 423 (“Ceballos’ proposed contrary rule, adopted by the Court of Appeals, would
commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial
oversight of communications between and among government employees and their superiors in the
course of official business. This displacement of managerial discretion by judicial supervision finds
no support in our precedents. . . To hold otherwise would be to demand permanent judicial
intervention in the conduct of governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with sound
principles of federalism and the separation of powers.”).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 422 (“This result is consistent with our precedents' attention to the potential societal
value of employee speech.”).
108. Id. (“Refusing to recognize First Amendment claims based on government employees’
work product does not prevent them from participating in public debate. The employees retain the
prospect of constitutional protection for their contributions to the civic discourse.”).
109. Id. at 438-39 (Souter, J., dissenting). See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)
(“We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy a
special niche in our constitutional tradition”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) (citations omitted) (“Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom
is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that case a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom. ‘The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools.’”); Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957) (a governmental enquiry into the contents of a scholar’s lectures at a state university
“unquestionably was an invasion of [his] liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political
expression—areas in which government should be extremely reticent to tread”).
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Kennedy responded to Justice Souter’s concerns110 by noting that there
might be an argument that additional constitutional interests are
implicated for expression related to academic scholarship or class room
instruction that are not fully accounted for by the Court’s customary
employee-speech jurisprudence.111 After making this note, though,
Justice Kennedy declined to explore what the analysis would be for a
case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.112
This additional limitation imposed by Garcetti does not effectuate a
large change to the traditional Pickering/Connick framework for several
reasons.113 First, the United States Supreme Court expressly declined to
decide whether this limitation should apply to scholarship or teaching,114
and thus refused to adopt any exceptions to the Pickering/Connick test.
Second, the Garcetti limitation may not apply when the employee
speaks or complains outside the course of performing his or her official
duties. 115 Presumably, an employee speaking or complaining outside of
his or her official duties would be exempted in the traditional balancing
test anyways because the speech would be characterized as a matter of
“public concern.”116 Third, the Pickering/Connick test only provided
limited protection to employee speech.117 Garcetti would simply abolish
any protection of employee speech made pursuant to an employee’s job
responsibilities.118

110. Id. at 425.
111. Id. (“Second, Justice SOUTER suggests today’s decision may have important
ramifications for academic freedom, at least as a constitutional value. There is some argument that
expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech
jurisprudence.”).
112. Id. (“We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct
today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or
teaching.”).
113. Id. at 424.
114. Id. at 425 (“We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we
conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or
teaching.”).
115. Tepper & White, supra note 22, at 148 (“the limitation may not apply when the employee
speaks or complains outside the chain of command”).
116. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-23 (“The First Amendment protects some expressions related to
the speaker’s job. . . Employees who make public statements outside the course of performing their
official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind of
activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government.”).
117. Id. at 424.
118. Id.
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III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
While universities may have self-regulating professional standards
concerning academic freedom, constitutional academic freedom is a
narrower concept in caselaw.119 Even though federal and state courts
have frequently referenced principles of academic freedom in their
opinions, “[t]he Court has been far more generous in its praise of
academic freedom than in providing a precise analysis of its
meaning.”120 The principles of academic freedom have rarely formed
the sole basis for court decisions and serve instead as a policy argument
in support of their decisions.121
Without any clear guidance from the United States Supreme Court,
lower courts (including district courts and court of appeals) have been
unsure as to whether an academic freedom exception to the Garcetti
limitation on the First Amendment right to free speech exists.122

119. Many institutions have committed themselves to the 1940 Statement. The Court, on the
other hand, has praised this concept of academic freedom, yet has not provided a precise analysis of
its meaning. Byrne, supra note 8, at 256-57.
120. Id. at 257 (“The Court has been far more generous in its praise of academic freedom than
in providing a precise analysis of its meaning. The Court has proclaimed that ‘[t]o impose any strait
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our
Nation,’ that ‘our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us,’ and even that ‘the classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of
ideas.’”).
121. See, e.g., Emergency Coal. to Defend Educ. Travel v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 545 F.3d 4,
18 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Silberman, J., concurring) (“The very notion of academic freedom—as a
concept distinct from the actual textual provisions of the First Amendment—is elusive.”); Burt v.
Gates, 502 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Thus, although the Third Circuit viewed academic
freedom as adding weight to the FAIR plaintiffs’ expressive association claim, academic freedom
was not itself necessary to its holding that Dale deference was appropriate. Indeed, FAIR I did not
hold that academic freedom altered the normal First Amendment analysis. Therefore, it would be
inaccurate to assume based on FAIR I, that the FAIR II court necessarily considered and rejected an
argument that academics have a heightened First Amendment right in speech or association or a
First Amendment academic-freedom right that is not subsumed in the freedoms of speech or
association.”); Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a claim
that a professor’s comments about university operations should enjoy more protection because of
academic freedom and concluding that such an argument would elevate academic personnel over
other governmental workers); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1293 n.14 (10th Cir. 2004)
(“Although we recognize and apply this principle [of academic freedom] in our analysis, we do not
view it as constituting a separate right apart from the operation of the First Amendment within the
university setting.”); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Though we are
mindful of the invaluable role academic freedom plays in our public schools, particularly at the
post-secondary level, we do not find support to conclude that academic freedom is an independent
First Amendment right.”).
122. Richard T. Geisel & Brenda R. Kallio, Employee Speech in K-12 Settings: The Impact of
Garcetti on First Amendment Retaliation Claims, 251 ED. LAW REP. 19, 33 (2010) (“An analysis of
published, post–Garcetti cases indicates the federal appellate courts are divided as to whether
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Conveniently, however, all of them have determined that if an academic
freedom exception did exist, it would not apply in their particular
scenario.123
A.

Circuit Approaches to the Academic Freedom Exception

The Second Circuit in Kramer v. New York City Board of
Education124 acknowledged that there were two possible standards to use
when analyzing teacher classroom speech. On one hand, teacher
classroom speech could be analyzed under the more protective standard
applicable to student speech.125 On the other hand, the Garcetti decision
left open the possibility that teacher’s official speech on matters of
public concern may qualify for additional protection under certain
circumstances.126 In this scenario, the teacher’s speech would be
analyzed as the official speech of the teacher as a public employee. 127

Garcetti should be applied to cases involving claims of retaliation for employee–related speech in
K-12 public schools.”).
123. See id.
124. Kramer v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 715 F. Supp. 2d 335, 352-53 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
125. Id. at 353 (citations omitted):
Students’ free speech rights are limited “in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment.” Schools may regulate student speech in three circumstances:
when the speech is (1) school-sponsored, (2) “offensively lewd and indecent,” or (3)
likely to cause substantial and material disruption of school activities.
....
School-sponsored speech includes words or their equivalent that “might reasonably
[be] perceive[d] to bear the imprimatur of the school.” Restrictions on such schoolsponsored verbalizations comport with the First Amendment if they are reasonably
related to legitimate teaching considerations. Whether a school’s speech restriction is
“reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical concern ‘will depend on, among other
things, the age and sophistication of the students, the relationship between teaching
method and valid educational objective, and the context and manner of the
presentation.’”
“The makeup of the curriculum . . . is by definition a legitimate pedagogical
concern.” In particular, a recognized concern is a school’s interest in accounting for “the
emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining whether to disseminate
student speech on potentially sensitive topics” such as “the particulars of teenage sexual
activity.”
Lewd, indecent, or vulgar speech by students is subject to broad restrictions and
regulations by schools. This authority is based in part on the state’s greater ability to
restrict the availability of sexually explicit material with respect to children than with
respect to adults.
126. Id. (“But the possibility remains that teachers’ official speech on matters of public concern
may qualify for protection in some circumstances.”).
127. Id. (“Should teacher classroom speech be analyzed as the official speech of the teacher as
a public employee . . .”).
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Without any binding authority to guide it, the Kramer court was
unable to choose one standard over the other.128 In the past, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit had extended the United States Supreme
Court’s standard for student speech to teachers’ instructional speech.129
But, other federal appellate courts were analyzing teacher speech using
the United States Supreme Court’s more restrictive standard for
analyzing official speech of public employees.130 Faced with these
divergent viewpoints, the Kramer court decided, “because of the lack of
national uniformity, teacher speech in the instant case [was to be]
analyzed below under both public employee and student speech
standards.”131
The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits
have determined that teacher instructional speech is not entitled to First
Amendment protection because teachers do not speak on matters of
public concern when they follow a school-mandated curriculum.132 For
example, in Gorum v. Sessoms, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit recognized that school faculty often engage in service
activities pursuant to their responsibilities.133 In this case, a tenured
professor and department chair claimed that he was terminated in
retaliation for opposing the candidacy of the university president, for
advising a student during a disciplinary proceeding, and for rescinding

128. Id. at 354.
129. See, e.g., Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722-23
(2d Cir.1994); see also Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 428
F.3d 223, 236 (Sutton, J., concurring) (6th Cir. 2005) (citing as examples of this approach: Ward v.
Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir.1993); Silano, 42 F.3d at 724; Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist.
No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir.1990); Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147
F.3d 718, 719 (8th Cir.1998); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir.1991); Bishop
v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir.1991)). But see, e.g., Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d
196, 198 (2d Cir.2010) (determining that a grievance filed by a teacher was unprotected speech
made pursuant to an official duty, without considering the relevance of his position as an educator).
130. Kramer, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 354 (“Other federal appellate courts analyzing teacher speech
have applied the Supreme Court’s more restrictive standard for analyzing official speech of public
employees.”).
131. Id.
132. See Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Penn., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir.1998) (concluding “that a
public university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will be taught in
the classroom”); Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir.1998) (en
banc) (limiting Hazelwood standard to cases of student speech); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch.
Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990) (holding teacher speech
attains “protected status if the words or conduct are conveyed by the teacher in his role as citizen
and not in his role as an employee of the school district”).
133. Tepper & White, supra note 22, at 160 (citing Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 186 (3d
Cir. 2009)).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss4/7

22

Tran: Academic Freedom Exception

13- TRAN_MACRO.DOCM

2012]

10/12/2012 3:04 PM

ACADEMIC FREEDOM EXCEPTION

971

an invitation for the president to speak at a prayer breakfast.134 “The
Third Circuit concluded that the professor was speaking ‘within his
official duties’ and found that he could advise the student because he
was a faculty member familiar with the disciplinary procedures through
his university committee work.”135 In addition, “the description of
faculty responsibilities included assisting and advising student
organizations.”136 The Third Circuit applied the Garcetti limitation
(unlike the Seventh Circuit) “because it viewed the professor’s activities
as clearly not within the realm of either teaching or scholarship.”137 As
such, the limitation would “not imperil academic freedom.”138 The court
also agreed with the lower court in “that the speech was not a matter of
public concern and not a substantial factor in the termination.”139 Thus,
the court agreed that the decision to terminate would have been made
regardless of the speech.140
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a pre-Garcetti
decision, applied the public employee test to teacher curricular
expression,141 but it did not categorically hold that instructional speech
was not protected by the First Amendment. Instead, the court looked to
the content of the speech to determine if it was protected.142 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has concluded that if the
academic exception is to apply at all, it would only be to post-secondary
education.143 For example, an elementary school teacher who spoke on a
political issue as part of her official duties would not be protected under
the First Amendment.144
The Seventh Circuit has demonstrated that it is capable of
determining what faculty members do because faculty functions may be
specifically defined by job descriptions and annual performance

134. Id. (citing Gorum, 561 F.3d at 182-84).
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing Gorum, 561 F.3d at 186).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Gorum, 561 F.3d at 187-88).
140. Id.
141. See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 428 F.3d 223,
228-29 (6th Cir. 2005).
142. Id. at 228-31.
143. Tepper & White, supra note 22, at 158 (citing Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687,
689, 694, 695 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007)).
144. Id. (citing Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007)).
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reviews.145 “In Renken v. Gregory, a professor who obtained a National
Science Foundation grant claimed that he had been retaliated against
when he took issue with the university’s proposed allocation of grant
funds.”146 “Acknowledging that university professors have teaching,
research, and service responsibilities,” the court applied Garcetti, and
held “that administering the grant was a part of those responsibilities.”147
“Although the professor argued that he had discretion [when] applying
for and administering the grant, the Seventh Circuit recognized that
securing and administering grant funds was done in fulfillment of his
teaching and research responsibilities, as well as the requirements
underpinning his promotion to full professor.”148 “The court adopted
this broad but practical view of what university faculty do, suggesting
that faculty members’ discretion over their research and service
responsibilities does not” mean that speech made on those subjects is not
made pursuant to employment responsibilities.149
B.

The Dilemma Exemplified in Savage v. Gee

The lack of national uniformity has become a problem that has
trickled down to the lowest courts. A prime example of this problem
was illustrated in Savage v. Gee.150 The plaintiff, Savage, was a State
university librarian, who volunteered to serve on his university’s book
selection committee to choose the reading assignment for all incoming
freshman.151 During the course of choosing a book, several critical
emails circulated regarding the nature of the book to be selected.152 One
145. Id. at 159 (citing Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 188 (3d Cir. 2009); Renken v.
Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 774-75 (7th Cir. 2008); Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1168-69
(C.D. Cal. 2007), appeal docketed, No. 07-56705 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2007)).
146. Id. (citing Renken, 541 F.3d at 773).
147. Id. (citing Renken, 541 F.3d at 773-74).
148. Id. at 159-60 (citing Renken, 541 F.3d at 774).
149. Id. at 160 (citing Renken, 541 F.3d at 774).
150. Savage v. McGee, 716 F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ohio 2010), aff’d, 665 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2012).
151. Id. at 710:
Plaintiff, Scott A. Savage (“Savage”), was Head of Reference and Library Instruction at
Ohio State University’s campus in Mansfield, Ohio from August 2004 until June 27,
2007, when he resigned . . . Savage was an elected staff representative to the faculty-staff
Executive Committee, which met regularly to exchange ideas with OSU-Mansfield Dean
Evelyn Freeman. In December 2005, Donna Hight (“Hight”), Student Affairs Director,
proposed to the Executive Committee that all incoming freshmen be assigned a
particular book to read. This proposal was accepted and, in 2006, Savage agreed to
serve on the committee formed to choose the book.
152. Id. at 711:
After several committee members made initial recommendations for books with liberal
points of view, Savage wrote to Hight to propose the book Freakonomics by Stephen
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of those emails seemed to underhandedly attack the polarizing nature of
one of the Savage’s suggestions.153 In response, Savage replied with
what he claims to have been a “sarcastic” email to the committee,
including four new book suggestions and a short description of each.154
One of those book suggestions was The Marketing of Evil by David
Kuplian.155 The librarian’s description neglected to mention that this
book “contain[ed] a chapter discussing homosexuality as aberrant human
behavior that has gained general acceptance under the guise of political
correctness.”156 Savage’s off-hand suggestion set off a flurry of critical
emails from certain committee members, who questioned Savage’s
competence and professionalism as a librarian for suggesting what they
considered to be a bigoted and homophobic book.157 The dispute gained

Dubner. Hight forwarded this proposal to the entire committee on March 2, 2006, noting
that she had received ‘a request that we . . . don’t choose an ideologically or politically
or religiously polarizing book.’ On March 3, 2006, Hamlin responded by email to the
committee, stating: ‘If the idea is to seriously engage the students in an issue or issues of
real importance, it is bound to be at least somewhat divisive.’ He further stated:
‘Furthermore, I think the university can afford to polarize, and in fact has an obligation
to, on certain issues.’
153. Id. at 711 (“In this lengthy email, Hamlin also made references to Christian
fundamentalism, which Savage inferred were directed at him.”).
154. Id. at 711. On March 8, 2006, Savage replied to the committee:
I am wondering if when Hannibal says “the university can afford to polarize, and in fact
has an obligation to, on certain issues,” he means the book chosen should necessarily
present views in line with University Human Resources policies or the University
mission statement? As a librarian, I wouldn’t agree with the imposition of any test of
academic orthodoxy. . . But if we are decided that we want to engage our students in the
kind of exchange of ideas on which the “secular” university of founded, then let’s choose
something that confronts the accepted wisdom of Ohio State University! Like students
and young profs did in the 60’s, man! In that spirit, here are four more suggested titles . .
.
Savage’s email then listed four book recommendations, each with a short description of its subject.
Savage testified that he was not seriously suggesting that anyone read those books or that he was
trying to make any point about homosexuality. Instead, trying to make a sarcastic point in response
to Hamlin’s remark about polarization. Id.
155. Id. at 711.
156. Id.
157. Id. On March 9, 2006, Jones wrote:
[W]hatever book we choose should have some scholarly merit. The anti-gay book Scott
Savage endorses falsely claims that “the widely revered father of the “sexual revolution”
has been irrefutably exposed as a full-fledged sexual psychopath who encouraged
pedophilia.” . . . By any scholarly standards . . . this kind of claim is . . . anti-factual
rabble-rousing that has no place in any university. I am frankly embarrassed for you,
Scott, that you would endorse this kind of homophobic tripe.
On March 9, 2006, Savage responded to Jones, copying other committee members, defending his
suggestion of The Marketing of Evil. Savage, Hamlin, and Jones exchanged more increasingly
agitated emails, with Jones and Hamlin criticizing Savage for suggesting what they characterized as
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publicity as senior faculty and staff, and various members of the gay
faculty community became aware of the recommendation.158
Eventually, sexual harassment charges were filed against Savage.159
Even though the charges were dropped, the faculty environment became
so hostile towards Savage that he resigned.160
On March 10, 2008, Savage filed an action in federal court
asserting various federal constitutional claims.161 One of the types of
relief he sought was an order finding that he had been constructively
discharged in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment right to

a bigoted and homophobic book. These exchanges degenerated to the point where Jones questioned
Savage’s competence and professionalism as a librarian. Id.
158. Id. at 711-12. Jones emailed Savage’s supervisor, Library Director Beth Burns:
I feel it is important as a faculty member here who relies on the library to tell you that
Scott Savage’s decision to stand by his recommendation of this anti-gay book for our
First Year Reading Experience, especially based on the reasoning he offers, severely
damages my confidence in the library and its staff here at OSU-Mansfield. It will affect
not only my use of the library staff in conducting my own research, but also my use of
the library staff in teaching and constructing research for my students.
On March 9, 2006, Burns emailed Dean Freeman complaining that Jones and Hamlin had engaged
in a “personal assault” on Savage. Meanwhile, another gay professor, Jim Buckley, emailed all
OSU-Mansfield faculty and staff, stating to Savage: “You have made me fearful and uneasy being a
gay man on this campus. I am, in fact, notifying the OSU-M campus, and Ohio State University in
general, that I no longer feel safe doing my job. I am being harassed.” This barrage of emails
continued over the next few days. On March 12, 2006, Jones sent an email to all faculty at the
Mansfield campus summarizing the dispute over Savage’s book recommendation and stating, in
part:
The fact that Scott continues to endorse a book that calls me and Jim and other gay and
lesbian people “evil,” and that he justifies this book on grounds that are ludicrous by
scholarly standards, says to me this is about homophobia-that the hatred (“evil”) and
irrationality (anti-scholarly defense) this term implies are clearly operative here. This
kind of defense would be unacceptable in support of a book that denied the Holocaust or
that argued that African-Americans were inherently biologically inferior to other people.
This is a matter of professional standards and competence, and it is also a matter of
harassment-of creating a hostile work environment insofar as part of our jobs (mine and
Jim’s, but also the faculty’s) is to use the library for research and teaching. . . .
Some of my senior colleagues intend to raise this issue in Monday’s Faculty
Assembly, and we are all interested in the entire faculty’s therefore being sufficiently
informed about the precise nature of the problem.
159. Id. at 713 (“. . . a regularly-scheduled faculty assembly meeting was held. Various faculty
members spoke and, at the conclusion of the meeting, a motion carried to forward the matter as a
sexual harassment issue to Human Resources.”).
160. Id. at 713-14 (“On April 20, 2006, Savage received a letter from Hill stating that the
University had determined that Savage was not guilty of the harassment charges filed against him . .
. Savage states that the “nasty and derisive tone of the University’s attorneys in both their written
and oral arguments to the Court of Claims convinced Mr. Savage that he would have no institutional
backing at the highest administrative level were he to return” to his position at OSU-Mansfield. On
June 27, 2007, Savage submitted a letter of resignation.”).
161. Id. at 714.
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free speech.162 The defendant’s motion for summary judgment was
considered in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio (Eastern Division).163
To come to a resolution of the issue, the court looked to the
standard that had been developed in the United States Supreme Court
from the interaction of Pickering v. Board of Education of Township
High School District,164 Connick v. Myers,165 and Garcetti v. Ceballos.166
Those three cases laid out the general framework of rules barring First
Amendment retaliation claims based on statements made by public
employees in the course of their official duties.167 However, these three
cases left open the issue of whether there is an academic freedom
exception for “scholarship and teaching” to the general rule, and if there
is, what the scope of it is.168
With such a dearth of binding authority, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio’s decision in Savage v. Gee
could only rely on two local cases.169 These two cases found an
academic freedom exception because the disputed expression concerned
162. Id. at 715.
163. Id. at 710.
164. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
165. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
166. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Savage, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 716 (“The outcome
of this claim depends largely on the correct interpretation of the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983), and Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).”).
167. Savage, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 716-17 (“[Pickering and Connick] held that one who spoke on
a matter of public concern was protected by the freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment
from retaliation by government, usually the plaintiff’s employer. The speech right had to be
balanced against the employer’s need to preserve the efficiency of the workplace . . . Garcetti added
the corollary that the speech, although it might be of public concern, is not protected by the First
Amendment if it is made pursuant to the public employee’s job duties.”). Applying these standards
to Savage v. Gee, the court would have to ask:
1. When Savage recommended The Marketing of Evil for the book list, was he speaking
as a citizen (as opposed to purely as an employee) on a matter of public concern? If not,
he has no cause of action based on the freedom of speech. If his speech meets both
criteria, Savage is protected from retaliation for it by his government employer (or here,
the employer’s alleged failure to protect him from the retaliation of others).
2. If Savage’s speech is of public concern but made in the line of duty as set forth in
Garcetti, should it nevertheless be protected under an “academic freedom” exception?
3. Since [sic] Savage resigned rather than being fired, was he constructively discharged?
Id. at 716.
168. Id. at 718 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425) (“There is some argument that expression
related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional
interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence.
We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply
in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”).
169. Id. at 718.
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“scholarship and teaching.”170 However, the two cases did not set out
any legal standards for what constitutes “scholarship and teaching”.171
Ultimately, the court in Savage v. Gee decided that the Ohio State
University librarian’s expression did not fall within the “academic
freedom” exception because it did not “look” like the speech in these
other two cases.172 The District Court declined to explore the existence
or scope of an academic freedom exception.173 Thus, the defendant’
motion for summary judgment was granted.174
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit again
revisited the issue of “academic freedom” exception.175 Once again, the
court declined to comment as to whether an “academic freedom”
exception existed because it had only been alluded to in Supreme Court
dicta.176 The court simply stated that if an exception did exist, Savage’s
speech fell outside its scope.177 As a committee member commenting on
a book recommendation, Savage’s speech was not related to classroom
instruction and only loosely related to academic scholarship.178 Yet, the
170. Id. (“The Sixth Circuit has not weighed in on this issue. Two decisions of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio have held that such an academic freedom
exception exists, however.”) (citing Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F. Supp. 2d 817, 842-44 (S.D. Ohio 2010)
(holding that Garcetti does not apply to First Amendment claim by professor for state medical
school) and Evans-Marshall v. Bd. Of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., No. 3:03cv091,
2008 WL 2987174, at *8 (S.D. Ohio July 30, 2008) (holding that Garcetti does not apply to First
Amendment claim by high school teacher), aff’d, 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010)).
171. See Kerr, 694 F. Supp. 2d 817, 843-44; Evans-Marshall, 2008 WL 2987174, at *8-9.
172. Savage, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 718:
In both of these cases, however, it was clear that the plaintiff’s expression concerned
“scholarship or teaching.” The Garcetti Court recognized no broader exception to the
rule it propounded. Savage’s recommendation of a book for a book list cannot, in the
opinion of this court, be classified as “scholarship or teaching,” however. The
recommendation was made in the line of duty, but it was made pursuant to an
assignment to a faculty committee. This court holds that, without exceptional
circumstances, such activities cannot be classified as “scholarship or teaching” in the
Garcetti sense.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 721.
175. Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 2012).
176. Id.
177. Id. (“Thus, even assuming Garcetti may apply differently, or not at all, in some academic
settings, we find that Savage’s speech does not fall within the realm of speech that might fall
outside of Garcetti’s reach.”).
178. Id. (“Savage’s speech as a committee member commenting on a book recommendation
was not related to classroom instruction and was only loosely, if at all, related to academic
scholarship.”); see also Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City, 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010)
(teacher curricular choices, including assignment of several books, were made in connection with
official duties as teacher and thus not protected speech); Fox v. Traverse City Area Public Schs. Bd.
of Educ., 605 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2010) (teacher’s complaint to supervisor about number of students
assigned to her was not entitled to First Amendment protection under to Garcetti limitation).
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court failed to define what “classroom instruction” or “academic
scholarship” would look like.179
C.

Unresolved Issues

As different circuit decisions have shown, several legal issues
remain unresolved that must be answered in order to come to a
resolution: (1) should an academic freedom exception to the Garcetti
limitation on the First Amendment right to free speech be recognized
and why?; (2) if an academic freedom exception were recognized, what
would be its scope?
These questions must be answered in order to uphold the integrity
of the First Amendment right to free speech. Currently, a large area of
speech, i.e. academic speech, remains unprotected by the First
Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has already suggested
that academic speech should be excepted from the Garcetti limitation.180
But, without any clear standard to follow, lower courts are unable to
definitively protect an area of speech that the United States Supreme
Court has stated is deserving of First Amendment protection. The clock
is ticking as to when a lower court will be confronted with a scenario it
believes would fall within the academic freedom exception. Its
existence and scope need to be defined before that time.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Should an Academic Freedom Exception Exist? Why?

While the struggle for academic freedom has been most frequently
characterized as a struggle between universities and external forces, the
struggle exists just as strongly internally between faculty and the
university.181 Even though courts have been loath to get involved in
internal university affairs,182 I propose that the First Amendment should
extend to protect all academic speech because of the overriding
importance of unencumbered academic speech.

179. Id. at 738-39.
180. Id.
181. Byrne, supra note 8, at 288 (“When the Supreme Court came to constitutionalize
academic freedom, it encountered a tradition of values and personnel procedures protecting the
individual scholar from non-academic judgments by college administrators.).
182. Id. at 325 (“[J]udges feel themselves incompetent to evaluate the merits of academic
decisions.”).
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Academic speech, as opposed to other types of speech that may be
exercised on a campus or by members of the academic community, is
necessary to the preservation of the unique functions of the university,
particularly the goals of disinterested and systematic scholarship and
teaching.183 “[T]he essence of constitutional academic freedom”
depends on “the insulation of scholarship and liberal education from
extramural political interference,”184 which can come from within the
university or from the outside community.
Academic speech is unique because it is produced under specific
disciplinary and ethical constraints.185 Scholars work within a particular
discipline, primarily directing their work at an audience of other scholars
and students within the same discipline.186 In turn, their audience
“evaluates their speech within a tradition of knowledge, shared
assumptions and arguments about methodology and criteria, and
common objectives of exploration or discovery.”187 This audience
provides a basic foundation for the scholar, because it “will listen with
care, consider with knowledge, and challenge with intelligence.”188 The
audience will be unlikely swayed by social standing, but rather objective
reason and evidence.189 A scholar has succeeded when he or she
improves on some worthy subject that the discipline has previously
accepted.190
A large part of academic speech’s value comes from the fact that
academic speech is rigidly formalistic:
Every lecture or article must presuppose the history and current canon
of the discipline; every departure from common understandings must
be explained and justified. Many lovely and personally satisfying
styles of expression are outlawed: The physicist may not sing, the
historian may not whine, the economist may not offer the primordial
scream. More seriously, the persons who may engage in this speech
are rigorously controlled. To enter the discourse, the scholar must
proceed through the university course of study—at great expense and
personal sacrifice—in order to be certified by her peers as competent

183. Id. at 262.
184. Id. at 255.
185. Id. at 258.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. (“The speaker cannot persuade her colleagues by her social standing, physical strength
or the raw vehemence of her argument; she must persuade on the basis of reason and evidence
(concepts vouchsafed, if only contingently, by her discipline).”).
190. Id.
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to engage in scholarly exchange. Students, even though adults in civil
society, are admitted as neophytes and treated as intellectual
dependents, so long as they lack mastery or certification. Students and
junior professors suffer real punishment for speech deemed inadequate
by the masters. In general civil society, the First Amendments opposes
both prior and subsequent restraint on the speaker by a class of
officials determining which speech is valuable and which is not.191

However, within this formalistic framework, the academic speaker
is free to reach conclusions that contradict previous dogma.192 The
speaker may even be driven to conclusions that contradict his or her own
preconceptions and cherished assumptions because of methodology and
evidence.193 “Academic speech can be freer than the speaker.”194 This
essential freedom has been the core reason for professorial insistence on
faculty autonomy within the university power structure.195 The scholar
cannot argue merely for his or her political party, religion, class, race, or
gender; he or she must acknowledge the force of traditional views of the
subject matter, the inadequacies of colleagues’ arguments, and the
arguments her critics.196 Disinterested argument is “not indifference to
the outcome, but insistence that commitment not weaken the rigor and
honesty by which the argument is pursued.”197
“The First Amendment value of academic speech rests on its
commitment to truth . . . its honesty and carefulness, its richness of
meaning, its doctrinal freedom, and its invitation to criticism.”198
191. Id. at 258-59.
192. Id. at 259 (“Indeed, such contradiction is prized as new knowledge, the mark of
contribution, the sine qua non of the doctoral dissertation.”). In fact, the community of scholars will
stand behind even the most mediocre scholar whenever civil authority threatens to punish
unorthodox scholarship. Those instances where it has failed to defend its fellow scholars are
incidents of permanent shame and regret. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (“The unique point is that academic speech can be more free than the speaker”).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 259-60. However:
These are not often identified as the justifications for the First Amendment
protection of speech. In society at large, freedom of speech insulates from penalty
expression that is vulgar, pernicious, incomprehensible, and mad. Even advertising,
which is wholly self-interested and manipulative, is protected. Only genitalia and false
statements of fact may usually be regulated. Only verbal provocations to crime, violence
and riot may be prohibited. The justifications for this regime are various but persuasive.
First Amendment doctrine recognizes the danger to a democratic political process if
officials proscribe some subjects or modes of expression. This sensitivity is heightened
by the enormous cultural diversity of the American polity. Advocates of free expression
also properly cast doubt both on the wisdom of officials, even when acting in good faith,
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Among the systems of discourse within our society, academic speech is
preeminent in holding expression to high standards and “provides our
most important model of expression that is meaningful as well as free,
coherent yet diverse, critical and inspirational.”199 Much of its value is
social because “we employ the expositors of academic speech to train”
those “who exercise[] leadership within our society.”200 “Beyond
whatever specialized learning our graduates assimilate,” they must also
learn “that careful, honest expression demands an answer in kind.”201
“The experience of academic freedom helps secure broader, positive
liberties of expression.”202
But, the history of academic freedom has been long wrought with
struggle between universities and lay trustees or regents, who sought to
impose their ideologies and political preferences on their professors’
scholarship.203 Professors demanded that their work be free from any
ideological test and that evaluation be reserved for their professional
peers.204 Their demands were justified by an appeal to science—that any
error in theory could only be perceived by trained specialists and error
must be tolerated if truth is to be advanced.205 Laypersons’ opinions
were not scientific and their interference would only retard the discovery
of truth.206

to decide which ideas are out of bounds and on the efficacy of combating apparently
dangerous ideas by suppressing them. Finally, many recognize the value to the
individual citizen of being the sole legal arbiter of what she shall say, read or think; such
freedom and responsibility dignify the citizen in a democracy.
Yet can it be said that these familiar themes exhaust the value to democratic society
of free expression? The First Amendment ought also to be aspirational. Society ought
to strive toward speech that is truthful, gracious, well-considered, and generous to
opponents. It ought not settle for, though it must often permit, speech that is ignorant,
self-interested, manipulative, hateful or vapid. Without some such ideal, actively
pursued, speech loses its value as communication, and thought loses its power to
persuade through appeal to reason. When discourse becomes debased, conflict of
interests within democratic society cannot be resolved or lessened through debate or
deliberation (because no one will take them seriously) but only through the parlay of
money, numbers and force. Speech should be protected because it is beneficial.
199. Id. at 261.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 273 (“In America, the problem was not the state as such, but interference by lay
trustees or regents.”).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. (“There are two important aspects of this struggle. First, academics wanted to wrest
control over the evaluation of scholarly thought from ‘lay thinking’ as represented by boards of
trustees. Professors were virtually the only spokespersons for academic freedom, and their efforts
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The same arguments that were made decades ago to preclude
laypersons’ interference in university affairs apply with equal force to
the proposition that academic speech must also be protected in addition
to being left alone. A freedom from lay interference is necessary for
scholars to perform uniquely valuable work.207 Unlike mere political or
religious opinion, scholarship bears a special relationship to the search
for truth, making it a form of elite speech that demands protection from
popular prejudices.208
Science also provides a strong rationale for the protection of this
freedom:
Scientific endeavor presupposes a progressive conception of
knowledge. Understanding at any one moment is imperfect, and
defects can be only exposed by continually testing hypotheses through
either adducing new data or experimentation. The process of
hypothesis-experimentation-new hypotheses improves knowledge and
brings us closer to a complete, more nearly objective truth about the
world. Error is not dangerous so long as the process is continued,
because acknowledged means will expose it; in fact, it is actually
beneficial (and inevitable) as part of progressive discovery.209

But, this scientific process will fail if academic speech is affirmatively
suppressed from within the university. It is not enough that that external
interference is unpermitted.
Universities face a unique type of danger from their own internal
contradictions.210 One contradiction is the university’s reliance on the
notion of professional competence.211 Trouble often ensues when
scholars depart from or challenge basic suppositions of a discipline.212
Unusual scholarship often generates visceral negative reactions while

were largely responsible for its eventual acceptance. In one sense, it was a self-interested struggle
for professional autonomy and dignity directed at improved salary and employment security.”).
207. Id.
208. Id. (“A primary condition was respect for the special character of academic speech:
Scholarship bore a special relationship to the search for truth and should not be confused with mere
political or religious opinion. Scholarship was a form of elite speech that demanded protection from
popular prejudices.”).
209. Id. at 273-74.
210. Id. at 283 (“Graver than the threat to academic freedom from other academic values is the
danger from its own internal contradictions.”).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 284 (“Norman Birnbaum has advised us to pay ‘explicit attention to the mechanisms
of academic succession, with their customary confusion of criteria of competence and of adherence
to conventional categories of thought.’”).
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professional disagreement and political opposition may lead to claims
and accusations that the challenger is incompetent.213
Furthermore, “those who challenge disciplinary axioms are likely to
be held to higher standards of competence than those who” remain in
safe and established pathways.214
“Academic freedom has taken firm root in American society
because of the widespread view that academic speech matters.”215
Disciplined attempts to challenge accepted and popular opinions provide
weight and depth to academic discourse and education.216 Beyond their
capacity to train students for white-collar jobs, colleges and universities
are also valued
because their work and the time we spend in them affirm the worth of
free inquiry and the capacity of the trained mind to see things, however
partially, as they are. The modern university epitomizes a liberal faith
that a free people can . . . cast off as authoritarianism without lapsing
into total relativism or incoherence.217

It is a well-established institutional norm of academic freedom that
“teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication
of the results, subject to the adequate performance of their other
academic duties,” and that “[t]eachers are entitled to freedom in the
classroom in discussing their subject.”218 These institutional norms are
so valuable that
the limitations of Garcetti should not apply because the core
functions of the university are research and teaching. Academic
freedom furthers the mission of the university: faculty become experts
in a discipline through research and analysis, and they teach students to
think critically. Professional competence is determined by faculty peer
review, and shared governance often is the means of implementing that
review. All of these functions have the potential to create controversy
and offend powerful internal and external constituencies; however, they
are essential to the credibility of universities and academic disciplines.219

213. Id. (“The sociologist who maintains that the entrails of an owl can render more useful
information than can a statistical survey is likely to be met with derision as well as disagreement.
The competence of a modern historian who insisted on a Whig interpretation of events while
focusing largely on the affairs of ‘great men’ would likewise be suspect.”).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 287.
216. Id. at 287-88.
217. Id. at 288.
218. 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 3.
219. Byrne, supra note 8, at 267.
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What Should the Academic Freedom Exception Protect?

The Garcetti limitation to the First Amendment right of free speech
should not apply when the speech involves scholarship or teaching
because it would be contrary to the academic freedom’s objective of
critical inquiry.220 But what is scholarship and teaching? Some have
simply boiled it down to an issue of location, i.e. did the speech occur in
the classroom or in a published article, book, seminar, or presentation
relating to scholarship?221
A more thoughtful analysis is warranted, such as the careful
consideration made by representatives of the American Association of
University Professors and of the Association of American Colleges in
formulating the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure. Their summary of “academic freedom” provides a working
model for the scope of an academic freedom exception. With respect to
the “scholarship” prong, professors should be entitled to: “full freedom
in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the adequate
performance of their other academic duties; but research for pecuniary
return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the
institution.”222 With respect to the “teaching” prong, professors:
are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject, but
they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching controversial
matter which has no relation to their subject. Limitations of academic
freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be
clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment.223

Using this model, the Supreme Court could begin to lay the framework
for an academic freedom exception to the Garcetti limitation.

220. Tepper & White, supra note 22, at 148 (“[E]ven though some content-based regulation is
an inevitable result of academic judgments about promotion and tenure, content-based censorship of
scholarship and teaching, whether the government restricts speech on non-academic grounds
because of disagreement with the message, is contrary to principles of academic freedom.”).
221. Brief of Appellees at *22, Capeheart v. Hahs, No. 11-1473, 2011 WL 5154818 (7th Cir.
Oct. 19, 2011) (“Capeheart’s claim is not premised upon speech in the classroom or scholarly
research. None of Capeheart’s speech took place in the classroom; none of it occurred in a
published article, book, seminar, or presentation relating to her scholarship.”).
222. 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 3.
223. Id.
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What Should be the Limits on the Academic Freedom Exception?
i. The exception should only apply to universities.

Only universities should get special treatment from the First
Amendment because universities are different and unique forms of
institutions.224 As stated by the United States Supreme Court: “in light
of ‘the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the
university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition.’”225 Many of the concerns discussed earlier in
Part IV.A are unique to university environments and do not apply to
lower levels of education.226 Furthermore, the interest with workplace
efficiency and order is higher with lower levels of education where
schooling is mandatory as opposed to voluntary.227
ii. The exception should only apply to faculty and staff, not
students.
Academic freedom does not include all First Amendment rights
exercisable on a campus or by members of the academic community228
such as student speech. Student rights of free speech are not properly a

224. Byrne, supra note 8, at 254:
American law operates on an impoverished understanding of the unique and complex
functions performed by out universities. All too often, courts fail to recognize that
universities are fundamentally different from business corporations, government
agencies, or churches. Concepts and categories developed in the law to regulate these
institutions are applied to university problems with varying degrees of awareness that
square pegs are being pressed into round holes. Our universities require legal provisions
tailored to their own goals and problems.
225. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 724 (2007)
(quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)).
226. See supra Part IV.A.
227. See generally Drew Appleby, The Differences Between High School and College and the
Importance of Student-Faculty Interaction for College Success, IUPUI (June 27, 2005),
http://www.iupui.edu/parents/success1.html.
228. Byrne, supra note 8, at 261-62:
Academic freedom was constitutionalized during a period in which the Court announced
other First Amendment rights of teachers and students.
Understandably, but
erroneously, academic freedom has been thought to encompass all First Amendment
rights exercisable on a campus or by members of the academic community. The term
“academic freedom” should be reserved for those rights necessary for the preservation of
the unique functions of the university, particularly the goals of disinterested scholarship
and teaching. The First Amendment rights I here wish to put aside are those general
civil rights of free speech incidentally exercised by members of the academic community
and enforced against public universities only because they are viewed as
instrumentalities of the state. These “civil” rights fall essentially into two categories.
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part of academic freedom because it does not have anything to do with
scholarship or systematic learning.229 Instead, students exercise the
same kind of rights of free speech enjoyed by citizens against the
government.230 Even academic evaluations of students by universities
are not a part of constitutional academic freedom because student civil
rights enforce social norms against schools but constitutional academic
freedom enforces academic norms against society.231
iii. The exception should not apply to speech made pursuant to
administrative duties.
The exception should not swallow the general rule that speech
made pursuant to an employee’s job duties is not protected by the First
Amendment, for the policy reasons leading to this Garcetti limitation.232
In fact, numerous decisions following Garcetti have held specifically
that “faculty member speech is not protected when made pursuant to
administrative duties to public universities.”233
But how are a faculty member’s administrative duties defined?
After Garcetti, many courts have recognized that a simple “duties”
analysis focusing solely on “core job functions is too narrow”234 and
impractical. Instead, the “duties” analysis should also involve looking
into an employee’s level and responsibility and context in which the
statements were made.235 Thus, speech could technically be made

229. Id. at 262-63:
First, no recognized student rights of free speech are properly part of constitutional
academic freedom, because none of them has anything to do with scholarship or
systematic learning. Cases allowing public school students to wear armbands,
demonstrate in good order, distribute newspapers, and form political organizations grant
students rights against public education officials plainly analogous to those enjoyed
generally by citizens against government. Moreover, such activities have little to do
with the formal academic training of the students; even if the activities so protected have
learning value, the learning seems more the product of experience than that of
intellectual training. Indeed, sometimes these political activities threaten academic work
and values, and courts have drawn the limit on the exercise of student civil rights at the
point where they interfere with the primary educational work of the school.
230. Id. at 262.
231. Id. at 263.
232. See supra Part II.C.
233. Brief of Appellees at *10, Capeheart v. Hahs, No. 11-1473, 2011 WL 5154818 (7th Cir.
Oct. 19, 2011).
234. Id. at *13 (quoting Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 774 (7th Cir. 2008)).
235. Id. (citing Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 2010)).
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pursuant to an employee’s official job duties even though it is not
expressly required or included in an employee’s job description.236
iv. The exception should not apply to extracurricular activities.
The right of a professor to participate in political activity off
campus and on her own time without institutional consequence should
also not be viewed as a matter of constitutional academic freedom.237
Professors have no greater or lesser right to participate in political affairs
than do other government employees, and would simply be exercising
their general civil rights as opposed to any right unique to the university
setting.238
V. CONCLUSION
Recognizing an academic freedom exception to the Garcetti
limitation on the First Amendment right to free speech would clear up
any misunderstanding amongst the lower courts. In addition, the
236. Id. (citing Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of N.Y., 593 F.3d 196, 203
(2d Cir. 2010)). This standard of looking beyond an employee’s job description has been applied in
several cases where a university faculty member has spoken in his or her administrative or service
role. E.g., Renken, 541 F.3d at 774; Gorum v. Sessions, 561 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2009) (speech
as student advisor unprotected).
237. Byrne, supra note 8, at 263-64:
Second, and more complicated, the right of a professor to participate in political
activity off campus and on her own time without institutional reprisal should not be
viewed as a matter of constitutional academic freedom. This assertion may seem
perverse. The notorious investigations of professors by state and federal officials for
“disloyalty” during the 1950’s have often been portrayed as the quintessential violation
of academic freedom, even though the conduct investigated nearly always involved nonacademic political organizing rather than scholarship or teaching. Also, the AAUP has
always included some protection of outside political speech within its principles of
academic freedom.
Yet, Professor Van Alstyne surely was right when he argued that professors at state
universities have no greater (or lesser) right to participate in political affairs than do
other government employees. Since the 1960’s, the First Amendment has protected state
employees from employment penalties for exercising general civil rights of free speech,
but it does not distinguish among professors, prosecutors, or janitors. Like student free
speech, the professor’s right to speak publicly on matters of public concern reflects the
permeation of the campus by general civil rights rather than an elaboration of a right
unique to the university. Advocates extended academic freedom to extramural speech
because, prior to 1950, civil liberty had not yet developed to the point where those who
exercised rights were protected against losing public employment. Moreover, at a time
when the state civil service was small, professors, by training and inclination, were the
most conspicuous state employees participating in public affairs; given their visibility in
politics, it is understandable that their right to participate should have been seen as part
of their academic freedom rather than as a general right of all state employees.
238. Id. at 264.
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exception would protect an area of speech that the United States
Supreme Court has already recognized to be uniquely important.
However, this exception should be limited to faculty academic speech,
which only includes scholarship and teaching. These and other
limitations will narrow the scope of this exception to only protect speech
that is uniquely dependent on the lack of restriction in order to remain
valuable.
Academic speech has been traditionally praised by courts.
However, academic speech cannot thrive in its fullest form unless it is
afforded protection under the First Amendment. Academic speech
doesn’t simply face the obvious threats from external lay interference; it
also is threatened from within the university system. Recognizing a First
Amendment right to free academic speech would recognize the
fundamental importance and value of academic speech. The creation of
an academic freedom exception is essential to free academic speech so
that society may reap its unhindered benefits.
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